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The United States is home to 5% of the world's population,
however, it houses nearly one quarter of the world's prison
population.' The prison population in the United States has been
rising since the early 1970s.' Since 1970, the prison population
has increased 500%,' nearly three times faster than the United
States population as a whole.' Some prisons house up to 200%
above their intended capacity.' In these facilities, prisoners live in
crowded gymnasiums with limited access to sanitation.6
Congested gymnasiums are cesspools of infection, and because the
prisons are overcrowded, prisoners lack access to reliable
healthcare.' The government has a constitutional obligation to
provide healthcare to prisoners,8 a task that becomes more difficult
as each new prisoner is locked away.
The late 1980s and early 1990s were periods of particularly
rapid prison expansion.' Shifts in federal and state laws led to
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soaring incarceration rates.o California, the primary focus of this
Article, more than doubled its prison population from 1989 to
2008." Because California is a bellwether state for criminal policy,
an examination of California and its prison population provides
insight into every other jurisdiction in the country. 2 Considering
that California's prisons were already reaching 200% capacity by
1990, the explosion in California's incarceration rates has led to
severe overcrowding in its prison facilities." Such conditions of
confinement often strip prisoners of their dignity as human
beings." In Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court addressed what
level of dignity the Eighth Amendment guarantees to those in
prison.' While the criminal justice system may deprive prisoners
of their liberty after a criminal conviction, these prisoners still
"retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons."
The United States' current penal system punishes more
people for longer periods of time than at any other point in its
history. 7 While the justice system has been busy packing prisons,
crime, especially violent crime, has been declining since the early
1990s.' However, instead of decreasing proportionately, the
United States' imprisonment rate continued to rise. 19
The disproportionate effect of United States criminal law on
minorities is well documented.20 This disparity is the cause of
Federal Prison Population Tops One Million (Oct. 27, 1994), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/PAM94.PR. The prison population grew
by more than 1,500 inmates a week during the first half of 1994 and expanded by
71,000 from October 1993 to October 1994. Id.
10. See MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA
26-29(2011).
11. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., MOVING FORWARD 5 (2009).
12. Joan Petersilia, California's Correctional Paradox of Excess and
Deprivation, 37 CRIME & JUST. 207, 210 (2008).
13. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 34
(1991). In 1991, some California prisons were already approaching 200% capacity.
Id.
14. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (depicting the conditions in
overcrowded prisons that constitute violations of constitutional rights).
15. Id. at 1922.
16. Id. at 1928.
17. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING, at vii (2006), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/bookerreport/BookerReport.pdf (describing the continued
increase in sentencing length over the past few years); TONRY, supra note 10, at 35
(showing increased incarceration as a whole and disproportionately so towards
Black Americans).
18. RYAN KING, MARC MAUER & MALCOM YOUNG, INCARCERATION AND CRIME:
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19. See TONRY, supra note 10, at 35.
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another more disturbing problem: the brunt of Eighth
Amendment violations is felt disproportionately by minorities.2 1
Many of the same criminal laws and procedures that have caused
our prison populations to expand out of control have subjected
racial minorities to systematic violations of their Eighth
Amendment rights.22
This Article will examine how the criminal policies of the last
few decades have influenced the violation of minorities' Eighth
Amendment rights. In Part I, this Article will dissect the "tough
on crime" era in which there was a dramatic increase in
incarceration rates in the United States.2 3 Part II of this Article
will explore the unique aspects of California criminal law that led
to extended sentences and disproportionate punishment of Black
Americans. Part III will look at the federal statutes governing
civil rights suits by prisoners. In Part IV, this Article will examine
the litigation that led to the court order to release prisoners.
Finally, the conclusion of this Article will explore and advocate
policy reforms that will decrease both California's prison
population and the racial disparity in the state's prisons.
I. The Impact of "Tough On Crime" Rhetoric on Racial
Bias and Prison Overcrowding
In 1972, the United States' state prison population was just
174,379, a far cry from the January 2010 number of over 1.4
million.24 The overall rate of imprisonment as of 2006 was 780 per
100,000, nearly five times greater than the 1970 rate of 161 per
100,000.25 Black Americans, however, have fared significantly
worse. In 1970, Black imprisonment was 593 per 100,000.26 By
2006, this number had soared to 2,661 per 100,000.27 The
percentage of Black Americans in prison approached 50% of the
total prison population in the mid-1980s, while Black Americans
made up only 12% of the general population.2 ' The two main
DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MANUAL FOR PRACTITIONERS AND
POLICYMAKERS 5-7 (Ashley Nellis et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).
21. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1940 (stipulating that California's healthcare
failures gave rise to Eighth Amendment violations that were system-wide failures);
MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 8 (reporting that California incarcerates Black
citizens at a rate 6.5 times higher than Whites).
22. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922.
23. See TONRY, supra note 10, at 35.
24. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010, at 1 (2010).
25. TONRY, supra note 10, at 15.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 27.
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drivers of prison population increase were the introduction of
mandatory minimum sentencing2 9 and changes in law
enforcement tied to President Reagan's war on drugs."0 While
these nationwide changes played a part in California's prison
expansion, three other oddities of the California penal system are
responsible for much of the increase in prison population: its
decision to relegate sentencing guidelines to the legislature,"
California's parole system,3 2 and its three strikes law.33 Many
other states have adopted similar policies," but California's
bellwether status helps make sense of national trends."
"Tough on crime" rhetoric has been a predominant theme in
state and national politics over the past few decades." The "tough
on crime" philosophy led to an era of disproportionate enforcement
of drug laws against Black Americans, both in terms of arrests and
imprisonment." By the early 1990s, state police and federal
officers were making 1.2 million drug-related arrests each year."
Of the drug cases actually prosecuted, over 80% of the defendants
were Black males." In this time frame there were also many
changes to the sentencing guidelines."o The most notorious drug
law of the time was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.4' Known as
29. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court has Mangled
American Sentencing Law and How it Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV.
367, 368 (2010).
30. See Erika L. Johnson, "A Menace to Society": The Use of Criminal Profiles
and Its Effects on Black Males, 38 How. L.J. 629, 639 (1995) ("In 1982, President
Ronald Reagan declared a 'war on drugs' after Americans proclaimed in national
polls that drug use was the number one domestic problem.").
31. David Muradyan, California's Response to Its Prison Overcrowding Crisis,
39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 482, 485 (2008); see Sara Mayeux, The Origins of Back-End
Sentencing in California: A Dispatch from the Archives, 22 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
529, 530 (2011).
32. Mayeux, supra note 31, at 529; Muradyan, supra note 31, at 485.
33. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., supra note 11, at 19.
34. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 396-97, 400 (1997) (detailing how other states that
have adopted multiple offender statutes include Florida, Georgia and West
Virginia).
35. Petersilia, supra note 12, at 210.
36. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 640.
37. TONRY, supra note 10, at 27.
38. John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The
National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
557, 568 (1990).
39. Id.
40. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 217(a), 98
Stat. 2019 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1984)).




the "100-1" law, it imposed an equal sentence for those possessing
5 grams of crack cocaine as for those possessing 500 grams of
powder cocaine.4 2 The United States Sentencing Commission has
reported that the people accused of crack cocaine offenses tend to
be Black, while most people who are accused of powder cocaine
offenses are not Black." Black Americans do not use or sell drugs
at higher rates than Whites," yet during the 1980s and 90s Black
Americans represented as high as 40% of all drug arrests while
composing less than 15% of the population." The shift in drug
policy was coupled with mandatory minimum sentences, many of
which were triggered by possessing a specified amount of drugs."
Mandatory minimum sentences increased prison population by
lengthening the sentence of conviction on the basis of evidence not
necessary for conviction of the underlying crime itself." The 1986
Act:
[R]equires a five-year mandatory minimum penalty for a first-
time trafficking offense involving five grams or more of crack
cocaine, or 500 grams or more of powder cocaine, and a ten-
year mandatory minimum penalty for a first-time trafficking
offense involving 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, or 5,000
grams or more of powder cocaine.
The comparative value between the two substances is eye
opening-5 grams of crack had a street value of $225 to $750 while
500 grams of powder cocaine would have been worth more than
$32,000.49 The law imprisoned low-level drug dealers,
predominately Black males, for terms that could be counted not
just in years, but in decades.o
42. Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to
Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REV. 721, 734 (2003).
43. Id.
44. See TONRY, supra note 10, at 59-67.
45. See id. at 57. Figure 3.1 shows that Blacks comprised over 40% of all drug
arrests in 1989. Id.
46. Bowman, supra note 29, at 377.
An example of this new type of mandatory minimum sentence would be a
statute that set the sentencing range for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance at zero to ten years, but in a separate provision
required that the defendant be sentenced to not less than five years if he
possessed a specified quantity of drugs.
Id. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(i)-(viii) (1988) (fixing mandatory
minimums for drug law violations).
47. See Bowman, supra note 29, at 377.
48. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 4-5 (2007).
49. Melissa C. Brown, Equal Protection in a Mean World: Why Judge Cahill
Was Right in United States v. Clary, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY
307, 313 (1997). The values are from 1986, the year that the law was passed. Id.
50. TONRY, supra note 10, at 1.
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Another national problem in criminal enforcement has been
racial profiling." Profiling by the police is a pervasive difficulty for
minorities in the United States.52 Racial profiling has long been
acknowledged by some in the judiciary,' even if the ultimate
power to curb racial profiling lays in the legislative and the
executive branches.' Black Americans are stopped and searched
by police at a disproportionately high rate considering the
relatively small proportion of the population they comprise." A
study released in 2010 shows that Black youth consume less
marijuana than Whites, but are arrested between four to thirteen
times more often than Whites for possession." The government
has constructed an average criminal, and that demographic is
Black and male."
II. California-specific Factors that Contribute to Racial
Bias and Prison Overcrowding
The "tough on crime" movement had a strong impact in
California. During this time period, the state made several
changes to its criminal laws that led to expanded definitions of
crimes and longer sentences." In 1976, California enacted the
Determinate Sentencing Act." Many state determinate sentencing
schemes were enacted as states bought into the national "tough on
crime" trend.60 The California determinate sentencing structure
shifted the control of determining length of sentences to the
51. See DEBORAH RAMIREZ ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A RESOURCE GUIDE
ON RACIAL PROFILING DATA COLLECTION SYSTEMS, PROMISING PRACTICES AND
LESSONS LEARNED 3-8 (2000) ("[R]acial profiling is defined as any police-initiated
action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin rather than the behavior
of an individual or information that leads the police to a particular individual who
has been identified as being, or having been, engaged in a criminal activity.").
52. TONRY, supra note 10, at 12.
53. Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 711 N.E.2d 108, 116 (Mass. 1999) (Ireland, J.,
concurring).
54. See id. at 122 (Fried, J., dissenting).
55. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 649-51 (1995); see also Samuel R. Gross &
Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the
Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 662 (2002). From January 1995 to June 2000,
40% of all roadside searches in Maryland were of Black citizens, even though they
comprised only 28% percent of the state population. Id.
56. Marijuana Profiling; Though They Use Marijuana Less, More Blacks than
Whites Are Arrested for It, a New Study Shows, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2010, at A18.
57. Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males:
Stopped, Searched, and Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 439, 440 (2004).
58. Muradyan, supra note 31, at 485.
59. Id.
60. Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 365-67 (1989).
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legislature, something that had previously been handled by a
parole board." The members of the parole board were insulated
from political pressures and could deliberate before releasing
guidelines for prisoners. On the other hand, members of the
legislature are up for reelection at regular intervals.' In
California, the legislature has rarely reduced the length of
sentences and has frequently increased them.' As one report
noted, "between 1984 and 1991, the California Legislature enacted
over 1,000 crime bills," with few bills aimed at reducing
sentencing." Constant increases to the length of sentences were
accompanied by a nearly 900% increase in the prison population,
from 20,000 in 1984 to 173,000 in 2007.6
Legislators are not the only public officials who feel pressure
to punish criminals. Judges who are elected can face similar
political pressures regarding their attitudes towards criminals.
The nature of judicial elections arguably requires judges to appear
to be "tough on crime."' Judges' sentences are more punitive the
closer they are to judicial elections. 69 There is also a demonstrated
racial skew in the length of sentences, with Whites being
sentenced on average thirteen days shorter than non-Whites."
These factors presented a unique problem in California where
state judges were allowed to find facts that could then be used to
increase a defendant's sentence to the maximum guidelines, even
when defendants requested jury trials." The Supreme Court
recently struck down this type of judicial fact finding for violating
the right to a jury." Even though the discretion is now gone,
judicial discretion played its role in increasing imprisonment
rates.
The sentencing regime in California is closely tied to
61. Muradyan, supra note 31, at 485.
62. See Petersilia, supra note 12, at 255.
63. See id.
64. Muradyan, supra note 31, at 485.
65. JOAN PETERSILIA, UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 5 (2006).
66. Murdayan, supra note 31, at 486.
67. Joanna Cohn Weiss, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary
Violate Criminal Defendants' Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1103-04
(2006).
68. Id. at 1113-16.
69. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 255 (2004).
70. Id.
71. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 271 (2007).
72. Id. at 273.
73. Huber & Gordon, supra note 69, at 255.
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California's parole system; the two have worked in tandem to
produce dramatic increases in length of incarceration and prison
population.4 California's parole system is used more often and
fails at a higher rate than the national average." The California
parole system experienced an even more dramatic increase in
population than the prison system." The number of parole
violators that returned to prison increased thirty-fold from 1980 to
2000." Since 1987, parole violators have been the largest group of
offenders entering California state prisons, making up nearly two-
thirds of the prison admissions in 2005." Most parolees who
return to prison return for technical parole violations, not
convictions for new crimes." The amount of discretion afforded
officials in the parole system has eroded over time.' Where
discretion has been maintained, Black individuals tend to have
their violations sent to the parole board and are recommended to
return to prison at a higher rate than non-Blacks." Prisoners in
California released on parole experience long cycles, alternating
between freedom and prison for parole violations.8
returned to prison, the parole sentence is placed "on hold,"
lengthening the overall time an individual is in the corrections
system.83
74. Petersilia, supra note 12, at 254-58.
75. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, BACK TO THE COMMUNITY: SAFE & SOUND PAROLE
POLICES 1 (2003), available at http://hc.ca.gov/lhcdir/172/execsuml72.pdf. Notably
California puts 13% more offenders on parole, has to recommit 32% more parolees
back to prison than the national average, and its parolees successfully complete
parole at a rate half that of the national average. Id. The Little Hoover
Commission is a state agency whose mandate is the preparation of reports and
recommendations regarding the operation and organization of California's state
government. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 8501, 8521-22 (West 2009).
76. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at 2.
77. Id.
78. Mayeux, supra note 31, at 529.
79. Ryken Grattet et al., Parole Violations and Revocations in California:
Analysis and Suggestions for Action, 73 FED. PROBATION 2 (2009). The rate at
which people return to prison in California for technical violations is about equal to
the rate which people return to prison for all parole violations nationally. Id. For a
list of rules that parolees must follow in order to avoid violations, see Parolee
Conditions, CAL. DEP'T OF CORR., http://www.cder.ca.gov/parole/parolee-conditions/
(last visited Nov. 18, 2012).
80. Grattet, supra note 79, at 4.
81. Id. at 10.
82. Mayeux, supra note 31, at 536.
83. Id. There is substantial evidence that the California parole officer's board
lobbied the state legislature with the express purpose of making it more difficult for
parolees to ever be fully released from parole. Id. Thus, just as there is national




While many factors have affected prison rates in California,
none is more well-known than the "three strikes law."' As of April
2009, almost a quarter of the inmate population in California was
incarcerated under the three strikes law.' The average length of a
sentence in California is nine years greater as a result of the three
strikes law.' Defendants who are convicted of multiple felonies at
once may face life imprisonment," and the felony that triggers a
sentence of life in prison is not required to be serious or violent.'
Black Americans make up 43% of all individuals sentenced under
the law, while making up less than 7% of the state population as a
whole." Indeed, at least in the early years of the three strikes law,
Black Americans were recommended for three strikes sentencing
six times more often than Whites.9 The result of the three strikes
law in California has been a dramatic increase in the prison
population, the brunt of which has been felt by Black inmates."
III. The Prison Litigation Reform Act and Federal Lawsuits
Regarding Eighth Amendment Violations
As the prison population rose, so too did the number of suits
filed by prisoners." The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was
enacted in response to a perceived abuse of the court system by
prisoners.93 The PLRA governs when a prisoner may file suit for
84. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(b) (West 2009). The law actually has two
provisions that increase sentence lengths. Id. If a defendant has one prior felony,
the length of the sentence for the current sentence is to be doubled; if a defendant
has two prior felonies, the sentence is the greater of twenty-five years or triple the
length of the sentence for the currently charged crime. Id. The provision doubling
sentences for one previous conviction is more of a primary driver of overcrowding.
See CAL. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 11, at 19 (2009); Vitiello, supra note 34, at 395.
85. CAL. STATE AUDITOR, CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., INMATES
SENTENCED UNDER THE THREE STRIKES LAW AND A SMALL NUMBER OF INMATES
RECEIVING SPECIALTY HEALTH CARE REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT COSTS 1 (2010).
86. Id. at 27.
87. People v. Fuhrman, 941 P.2d 1189, 1199 (Cal. 1987) (holding that multiple
felony charges in a single trial may count as multiple "strikes" towards a prisoner's
"three strikes" sentencing).
88. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003).
89. William Claiborne, Study Finds Disparity in 'Three Strikes' Law: Blacks in
California Disproportionately Sentenced, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1996, at A3.
90. Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California's
"Three Strikes and You're Out" Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 65, 70 tbl.4 (1999).
91. See Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison
Policy: Twenty-Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 PSYCHOLOGIST
709, 718(1998).
92. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).
93. Lynn S. Branham, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Enigmatic
Exhaustion Requirement: What it Means and What Congress, Courts and
Correctional Officials Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483, 505 (2001);
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violation of their constitutional rights." The law places significant
hurdles for prisoners to overcome before filing a suit in federal
court." One of the most significant changes to the PLRA is its
exhaustion provision.' While prior federal law had attempted to
give prisoners relatively easy access to federal courts," the PLRA
forces prisoners to maneuver through complex administrative
procedures internally at prisons before bringing suit."
Even if a prisoner gets into court, there are several
intermediate steps before the court may issue a prison release
order. The court must first issue an order "for less intrusive relief
that has failed to remedy the deprivation of the Federal right
sought to be remedied . . . ."" The defendant of the initial suit
must then be given "a reasonable amount of time to comply" with
this order.'" Only after these conditions are met can a Federal
judge issue an order to convene a three-judge panel."' This panel
has the power to enter a release order if it is shown by "clear and
convincing evidence that-(i) crowding is the primary cause of the
violation of a Federal right; and (ii) no other relief will remedy the
violation of the Federal right.""' The PLRA sets strict guidelines
for prospective relief. The changes required that such relief be
"narrowly drawn, [extend] no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation .. .".' All of the barriers and
roadblocks took their toll quickly, and prisoner civil rights suits
dropped nearly 40% in the first four years after the PLRA was
passed."
Jennifer Winslow, The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Physical Injury Requirement
Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant to?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655, 1657 (2002).
94. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat.
1321, 1321-66 (1996) (codifying prison release orders as a remedy for
overcrowding).
95. Branham, supra note 93, at 489-98. The law restricts the right to
prospective relief, increases barriers to filing in forma pauperis, and bars suit for
emotional injuries. Id.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (1994) ("No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.").
97. Eugene Novikov, Stacking the Deck: Futility and the Exhaustion Provision
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 817, 819-21 (2008).
98. Id. at 818-21.
99. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i) (West 2011).
100. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii) (West 2011).
101. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3)(B) (West 2011); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2284 (West 2011).
102. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3)(E) (West 2011) (emphasis added).
103. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (West 2011).
104. JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S.
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IV. Federal Jurisprudence Regarding the Violation of
Constitutional Rights in Prisons
A. Failure to Provide Mental Health Care
Brown v. Plata" is the culmination of seventeen years of
litigation stemming from two separate class-action suits: Coleman
v. Wilson'" and Plata v. Schwarzenegger.'07  In 1990, a class of
prisoners with serious mental disorders filed suit alleging a
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment." After a thirty-nine day trial, the Coleman
district court found "overwhelming evidence of the systemic failure
to deliver necessary care to mentally ill inmates."'" Prisons failed
to implement necessary suicide prevention procedures "due in
large measure to the severe understaffing that exists ... ." In
1995, a Special Master was appointed to oversee development and
implementation of a remedial plan of action."' Twelve years after
his appointment, the Special Master filed a report stating that
mental health care in California's prisons was deteriorating and
attributed this deterioration to overcrowding." 2 In those twelve
years, California prisons added almost 40,000 new prisoners.
B. Failure to Provide Adequate Healthcare
In 2001, a second suit, Plata v. Schwarzenegger, for Eighth
Amendment violations was filed by a class of California prisoners
alleging constitutional deficiencies in the level of healthcare
provided to prisoners."' California stipulated to a remedial
injunction, which resulted in the district court appointing a
receiver."' The court took note of overcrowding in the state's
DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980-2000, at 1 (2002), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdflppfusdOO.pdf
105. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1934 (2011).
106. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (bringing a claim of
serious deficiencies in prison mental health care).
107. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253 (N.D. Cal. 2005)
(alleging lack of adequate healthcare for prisoners with serious medical conditions).
108. Coleman, 912 F. Supp. at 1293.
109. Id. at 1316.
110. Id. at 1315.
111. Id.
112. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1926 (2011).
113. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., supra note 11, at 5.
114. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932243 at *1 (N.D. Cal.
2005).




prisons, noting that 350 prisoners had been shoved into a tiny gym
stacked on double-bunks."6 The court believed that the "extreme
state of overcrowding, and the failures of past administrations to
take medical care seriously" warranted the appointment of a
receiver."' The order implied that appointing a receiver was not
the most extreme remedy at their disposal."' The court was
perhaps foreshadowing a belief that California's prison system
would be unable to remedy the constitutional crisis that it had on
its hands."9
C. California Reacts
These federal court rulings got the attention of Californians.
In 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger declared a state of emergency
in the state prison system, citing "conditions of extreme peril to
the safety of persons" housed in state prisons.12 The Little Hoover
Commission released a scathing report detailing the failures of
politicians to get serious about the overcrowding in California
prisons.121 The report articulated specific recommendations about
how to get California's prisons back to constitutionally appropriate
levels,'22 noting that if California failed to take action it would cede
control of its prison system to the federal court system.123
D. Cases Consolidated Under Three-Judge Panel
In 2007, plaintiffs in each of the Eighth Amendment cases
pending in California filed motions for a special three-judge panel
116. Plata, 2005 WL 2932243 at *3.
117. Plata, 2005 WL 2932253 at *25.
118. Plata, 2005 WL 2932243 at *8.
119. Federal courts had intervened with California prison systems several times
before. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
California prisons violated the Americans with Disabilities Act); Perez v. Tilton,
No. C 05-05241, 2006 WL 2433240 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (ruling that federal prisons are
required to provide prisoners with adequate dental care).
120. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR PROCLAMATION 4278, PRISON OVERCROWDING
STATE OF EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION (Oct. 4, 2006), http://www.rbg-law.com/wp-
content/uploads/P-001-JTE-1.pdf.
121. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA'S CORRECTION CRISIS: TIME
IS RUNNING OUT (2007), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc/185/Reportl85.pdf.
The report highlights the main political barriers to prison reform. Id. at 2. There
is no political will to reduce harshness of criminal sentences and no money to build
new prisons. See id. If the Governor and legislature are unable or unwilling to
institute reform, the report recommends handing control of prison reform to
politically insulated groups that have as their sole mandate a goal of improving
prison conditions in California. Id. at 15-16.
122. Id. at 31-32.
123. Id. at 1.
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to be convened.'24 In 2009, the panel issued an order to reduce
California's prison population to 137.5% of their maximum
enrollment.' The court found "overwhelmingly persuasive"
evidence that the state's failures at providing constitutional levels
of healthcare were due to overcrowding in the penitentiaries."
Expert testimony at trial had concluded that "the overcrowding
and facility life-safety and hygiene conditions create a public
health and life-safety risk to inmates who are housed there.""
The opinion by the court pulled no punches in describing the
unsanitary conditions experienced by inmates or placing blame for
the constitutional failures of California's prison systems."" The
judges cited the state's "tough on crime" policies and political
unwillingness to address the overcrowding as key drivers of the
current crisis."' California appealed the three-judge order,30 and
in June 2010 the Supreme Court granted certiorari."'
E. Brown v. Plata: Supreme Court Affirms Findings of
Constitutional Violations
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Plata reached a 5-4 decision
splitting along ideological lines with Justice Kennedy joining the
majority."' The Court upheld the prison release order of the three-
judge panel," and the panel gave California until June 27, 2013 to
comply with the release order.'" The split between the majority
and the dissenters was over the proper interpretation of the PLRA
and its application to the Eighth Amendment claims in the federal
124. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL
2430820 at *27 (E.D. Cal. and N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009).
125. Id. at *75.
126. Id. at *62.
127. Id. at *6 (quoting Med. Experts' Report on San Quentin at 13, Plata v.
Schwarzenegger, 2005 WL 2932253).
128. Id. at *1-8 ("The problem of a highly dysfunctional, largely decrepit, overly
bureaucratic, and politically driven prison system, which these defendants have
inherited from past administrations, is too far gone to be corrected by conventional
methods.").
129. Id. at *1.
130. Jurisdictional Statement at 1, Schwarzenegger v. Coleman, 2010 WL
1506722 (2010) (No. 09-1233).
131. Bob Egelko, High Court to Rule on State Inmate Reductions, S.F. CHRON.,
June 15, 2010, at C2.
132. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
133. Id. at 1923.
134. Carol J. Williams, State Is Given Strict Deadline to Reduce Prison
Population; There Must Be 14,000 Fewer Inmates By the End of the Year and 37,000
Fewer By 2013, L.A. TIMEs, July 1, 2011, at AA4.
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135district courts. Regarding the actual amount of harm
experienced by the inmates, the majority noted that "society takes
from prisoners the means to provide for their own needs . . . . A
prison's failure to provide sustenance for inmates 'may actually
produce physical 'torture or a lingering death.""136 Additionally,
the majority accepted the release order as narrowly drawn
because, even though the 137.5% cap chosen by the district courts
applied to California's prison system as a whole, the order did not
control prisoner treatment beyond the scope of the violation.137
Justice Scalia's dissent focused on the breadth of the injunction,
calling it a "structural injunction" which blurs the line between
the judiciary and the executive.' 8 Justice Alito and Chief Justice
Roberts focused on the perceived risk of releasing 46,000
prisoners.13' They argued that such a comprehensive prison
release order does not "give substantial weight to any adverse
impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice
system caused by the relief" as required by the PLRA.140
V. Description of the Gravity of the Problems Created by
Prison Overcrowding and Minority Over-Incarceration
Decades of "tough on crime" policies produced incarceration
rates that are stunningly racially disproportionate.'' In
California, only 6% of the adult population is Black, but almost
one third of the state's prison population is Black. 4  The trend of
over-incarcerating minorities and prison overcrowding did not go
unnoticed.'" There were numerous warnings that the state was
over-incarcerating minorities and that the prisons were
overcrowded.'" Particularly after the Receiver and Special Master
had been appointed by the district courts, state agencies and the
California Department of Corrections attempted to reform the
135. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922-23.
136. Id. at 1928.
137. Id. at 1939-42.
138. Id. at 1952-54.
139. Id. at 1965-68.
140. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (West 2011); Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1965.
141. TONRY, supra note 10, at 28.
142. JOSEPH M. HAYES, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., CALIFORNIA'S CHANGING
PRISON POPULATION 2 (2012). In fact, two-thirds of all female inmates and three-
quarters of all male inmates in California are racial minorities. Id.
143. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 18. In 1988, California
made a bond sale of $817 million to build new correctional facilities to relieve
overcrowding. Id. This was six years before the state passed the three strikes law.
Id.
144. Id. at 18-19; Claiborne, supra note 89, at A3.
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system. In the end, the results of the "tough on crime"
movement and the inherently political nature of trying to change
our criminal system made reform impossible.'" As early as 2005,
the state acknowledged to the federal court with jurisdiction over
the Plata case that there was no conceivable way for California to
organize the prisons to meet constitutional standards."'
. Reports from the Special Master and the Receiver set a grim
picture of the state of California's prisons. One such report found
mental health care wait times up to twelve months. 4' These long
waits took their toll. In 2006, the suicide rate in California prisons
was 80% higher than the national average for prison suicides.""
Evidence before the court indicated that physically sick inmates
fared no better. "[U]p to 50 sick inmates may be held together in a
12-by-20-foot cage for up to five hours awaiting treatment.""o An
officer testified that "antibiotic-resistant staph infections spread
widely among the prison population and described prisoners
'bleeding, oozing with pus that is soaking through their clothes
when they come in to get the wound covered and treated."""' A
medical expert described such crowding conditions as "breeding
grounds for disease.""' In situations like these, where inadequacy
is so widespread and prisoners are all equally exposed to
infections, a court cannot efficiently determine which specific
prisoners experienced violations of their constitutional rights."
At best a court can determine, as they did here, that the rights of
the prison population as a whole are violated,"4 and that
population is disproportionately made up of minorities.'
Compounding the underlying constitutional debacle is
minorities' unsatisfactory access to healthcare outside of prison."'
145. LITTLE HoOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 6-13.
146. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL
2430820 at *1, (E.D. Cal. and N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009); see LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N,
supra note 121, at 6-13.
147. Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351, 2005 WL 2932253 at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 3, 2005).
148. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 (2011).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1925.
151. Id. at 1933 n.7.
152. Id. at 1933.
153. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1940.
154. See id.
155. MAUER & KING, supra note 2, at 3.
156. Dep't of Health & Human Serv. Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality,




Minorities suffer from asthma, heart disease, diabetes, HIV, and
many infectious diseases at higher rates than non-minorities.'
Substandard healthcare for minorities is a problem in and of
itself,"' but when coupled with the disparate impact of our
criminal laws, the problem becomes much more serious. For all
but the most destitute individuals, healthcare quality decreases
upon entering prison."' The prison healthcare system is
particularly cruel to those who had inadequate healthcare access
outside of prison. Diseases that were untreated or undiagnosed on
the outside stand little chance of being adequately dealt with
inside the prison walls. 6 o Minorities in the United States have
less opportunity to access quality healthcare and a higher risk of
being incarcerated."' Once they are incarcerated, the chances of
them being properly treated are low.'62
Overcrowding of prisons and over-incarceration of minorities
are intimately connected. California's over-incarceration of
minorities is an underlying cause of the prisons' constitutional
violations. On the date that the prison release order was affirmed
by the Supreme Court, there were about 140,000 prisoners in
California." The court order required that number of prisoners be
reduced to 110,000.164 Reducing the number of Black Californians
in prison to match their demographics in the state as a whole
would result in releasing almost the exact same number of
prisoners as the Plata order.' 5 Because of political pressures,
157. Jan H. Richardus & Anton E. Kunst, Black-White Differences in Infectious
Disease Mortality in the United States, 91 Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1251, 1252-53
(2001); Dep't of Health & Human Serv. Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality
supra note 156; Dep't of Health & Human Serv. Agency for Healthcare Research &
Quality, Diabetes Disparities Among Racial and Ethnic Minorities (Nov. 2001),
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/diabdisp.htm.
158. Dep't of Health & Human Serv. Agency for Healthcare Research & Quality,
supra note 156.
159. See Michele Westhoff et al., An Examination of Prisoners' Constitutional
Right to Healthcare: Theory and Practice, 20 HEALTH LAW 1, 7-9 (2008) (exploring
the paradox that prisoners are the only group with a constitutional right to health
care, but that the health care they receive is often quite poor in quality).
160. Id.
161. Nancy Neveloff Dubler, The Collision of Confinement and Care: End-of-Life
Care in Prisons and Jails, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 149, 149 (1998).
162. Id.
163. Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4 Tell California to Cut Prison Crowding, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 2011, at Al.
164. Id.
165. See Hayes, supra note 142, at 2. Reducing the number of Black prisoners to
match state demographics or obeying the court release order would each require a
release of about 25% of the state's prison population. Id. See also Brown v. Plata,
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (estimating the court order would require a population
reduction between 38,000 and 46,000).
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California has been unable to raise money to build new prisons,'"
unable to reduce sentences on many state crimes,'67 and unable to
maintain an effective parole system.'68 California spends almost as
much on its prisons as it does on its universities," and somehow,
when the state was nearly insolvent, politicians could not muster
the political will to fix the state's prison system.'
VI. Possible Solutions to Alleviate These Problems
Solutions to California's overcrowding problem must not
focus just on alleviating civil rights violations but on rectifying the
disproportionate incarceration of Black Americans as well.
Therefore, simply building new prisons or shipping prisoners from
one state to another should be ruled out. Both of these "solutions"
do nothing to improve racial disparity in prisons. Since
California's prison crisis took several decades to develop, there has
been ample time to examine the laws and policies of the state and
appreciate their impact."' Because numerous factors contribute to
California's current prison crisis, a variety of strategies can be
implemented to reduce both population and racial disparity.'73 The
state should consider changes to its three strikes law and parole
system. Other states have used "racial impact statements" to
monitor racial disparity and make changes to laws when disparity
174becomes apparent. By carefully considering its options,
California can repair the dual failures that their prison system has
created, and thereby set an example for the rest of the nation to
follow.
A. Prison Release as a Possible Remedy
Before describing how California should fulfill the Court's
166. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939. The Court references the inability of the state
to build its way out of the current crisis as a justification for ordering prisoner
relief. Id.
167. Petersilia, supra note 12, at 255.
168. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 22-24.
169. Petersilia, supra note 12, at 268.
170. Id. at 273.
171. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1938. The Court suggested that plans to relocate
prisoners out of state had been inadequate to solve the prison overcrowding crisis.
Id. The Court deemed it unrealistic for California to build itself out of the current
prison crisis. Id.
172. Petersilia, supra note 12, at 207-11.
173. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1943.
174. Press Release, Office of the Governor & Lieutenant Governor, Governor




order, it is important to consider if a release order is an
appropriate judicial remedy. As previously noted, both dissenting
opinions in Plata highlight the public safety concerns of releasing
prisoners."' Referring to a prior prison release order in
Philadelphia, the dissenting Justices expressed apprehension that
released prisoners will rein untold chaos in California.17' However,
this position overlooks the fact that 95% of those in prison are
eventually released back into society. 17 It strains credulity to
allege that California plans to release its most dangerous
criminals because of the release order."' This argument also
overlooks the truth that in California the correctional system
places 95% of all prisoners on parole."' Most prisoners released on
parole return to prison for technical violations."' If California
switched to an alternative method of sanctions for technical
violations, its prisons would have never become so overcrowded to
begin with."' Thus, the dissenters' fears were misplaced;
California already releases more prisoners each year than the
release order demands."8
Another objection raised by the respective dissents was that
the three-judge panel and the majority improperly construed the
PLRA to justify the release order."' Scalia argues that a prisoner
release order should never be issued unless it can be shown that
only a release order and no other form of remedy could possibly
alleviate violations of a prisoner's constitutional rights."' Because
the statute requires relief to be "narrowly drawn," the release
order should be issued to release only the prisoners who can show
that their constitutional rights were violated."' In fact, if a
prisoner cannot show that his or her rights were violated, he or
175. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1956-61.
176. Id. at 1965-66.
177. Christine M. Hummert, Middle of the Road Wakefield, Ohio, and Pre-
Release Planning for Mentally-Ill Inmates, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 295, 297 (2011).
178. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1957 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alluding to inevitable
murders and other crimes of prisoners to be released).
179. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at 1.
180. Grattet, supra note 79, at 2-3. Parolees have high parole requirement
failure rates, causing them to account for two-thirds of all persons admitted to
California prisons. Id.
181. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at xii-xv. Nearly 90,000
prisoners are returned each year to prison as a result of technical violations. Id.
That is more than double the number of new offenders in any given year. Id.
182. See id. at 12-15.
183. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1958-68.




she is not released from prison.'86 Aito focused on the statute's
requirement that overcrowding be the primary reason for
constitutional violations and that no other form of relief be
available to alleviate the violations .
Justice Scalia's concerns turn the primary foundation of a
class action lawsuit on its head.'8 If every individual prisoner was
required to meet the requirements of the PLRA, courts would not
be able to adequately relieve the majority of the constitutional
violations in California prisons.189 In Plata, it was impossible to
sort out exactly which prisoners were experiencing de-facto
violations of their rights.'" Wait lists for medical attention were
over 700 patients long and prisoners lived in tiny gymnasiums too
overcrowded to effectively manage the spread of disease.'"' In such
conditions, the adequacy of the healthcare provided to each
prisoner is connected to the adequacy of the care as a whole.19
Crowding is evidently the main driver of the constitutional
violations to prisoners."' There are only two possible solutions to
the crowding problem: building new prisons or setting prisoners
free.'" The Court cannot compel the former,' but is given explicit
statutory power to order the latter."* Therefore, in this situation,
the prison release order was the proper judicial remedy.
B. Reform of Three Strikes Laws
The judicial system neither has the power nor the authority
to correct all the systemic problems that lead to overcrowding; it
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1962-64.
188. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1443 (2010) ("A class action, no less than traditional joinder . . . merely
enables a federal court to adjudicate claims of multiple parties at once, instead of in
separate suits.").
189. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926. The Coleman suit began in 1990 and took
over twenty years to obtain a release order. Id. During that same time, the
California prison system was admitting 38,000 new prisoners each year. LITTLE
HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at xiv. Unless handled together in a class action,
it is difficult to see how every prisoner could obtain a remedy to a civil rights
violation.
190. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939-40.
191. Id. at 1933.
192. See id. The majority makes it clear that the cramped and confined nature
of the prisoners living conditions coupled with inadequate healthcare is of great
concern to them. Id.
193. Id. at 1934.
194. Id. at 1931-33.
195. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(C) (West 2011).
196. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(3) (West 2011). The statute defines in detail
exactly how courts can issue a prison release. Id.
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can at most issue decisions that invite legislators to begin
reform.197 Both state and federal legislators can institute a wide
array of changes to decrease prison crowding and racial disparity.
For example, in California, drug-related arrests have been
declining since the year 2000." While the decrease in newly
admitted inmates will eventually lead to a decrease in
imprisonment rates, many inmates sentenced under the three
strikes law or the "100-1" law are still serving sentences.'" The
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 reduced the base charge for possession
of crack and will now retroactively apply.2 00  Consequently,
currently incarcerated defendants may appeal their sentences.2 01
California should explore a similar retroactivity for inmates
convicted of drug-related offenses under its three strikes law.
Allowing three strike convicts to challenge their sentence would
decrease racial disparity; at one time nearly half of all those
convicted under the three strikes law were Black Americans.202
Many inmates incarcerated under the three strikes law are
imprisoned for non-violent offenses, and drug-related offenses
make up a significant portion of the three strikes population.203
Allowing prisoners to appeal their three strikes drug convictions
will help reduce incarceration rates and decrease the number of
minorities in California's prisons.204
As with most criminal justice reforms, the main obstacle to
197. See Douglas A. Berman, Foreword: Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering
Modern Sentencing Process, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 685-86 (2005)
(advocating that the Booker decision is a judicial invitation to reexamine
fundamental aspects of sentencing procedures).
198. Hayes, supra note 142, at 2.
199. See Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing
Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 25 (discussing the
increase in the number of prisoners who are serving prison sentences as a result of
the "war on drugs"); see also CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB, supra note 11, at 19
(documenting that more than 40,000 prisoners serving in California prisons were
sentenced under the three strikes law).
200. Joshua D. Asher, Unbinding the Bound: Reframing the Availability of
Sentence Modifications for Offenders Who Entered into 11(c)(1)(C) Plea Agreements,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1004 (2011).
201. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat 2372 (2010); Asher,
supra note 200, at 1004-05.
202. See Claiborne, supra note 89. In 1996, Blacks accounted for 43% of those
imprisoned under the three strikes law in California. Id.
203. See CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB, supra note 11, at 19 (commenting on
how roughly 8,000 prisoners are incarcerated under the three strikes law for drug
related offenses).
204. See Mauer, supra note 199, at 26 (asserting that 53% of all persons
incarcerated for drug charges are Black Americans); Males, supra note 90, at 67
(showing that Black Californians are six times more likely to be recommended for
three strikes sentencing than Whites).
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allowing prisoners to appeal their sentences will be political. 25
However, studies have shown that the three strikes law has no
deterrent effect. 2" Furthermore, Californians themselves took
significant steps to curb the impact of the three strike law by
passing Proposition 36.207 Allowing prisoners to appeal their three
strikes sentences will take political capital to succeed, but the
Supreme Court's opinion may have created a political climate
where this change is possible.
Another important reason to be wary about lengthy sentences
is that most people tend to "age out" of being criminals.208 For
three strike offenders, life imprisonment incapacitates them well
past the age where they are likely to be a danger to society.20
Middle-aged individuals are much less likely to return to prison
than those in their youth.210 On the other hand, a person's health
deteriorates with age, and older prisoners require substantially
more medical care than younger prisoners do.2" Aging prisoners
that develop serious medical conditions demand a disproportionate
share of medical care in prisons.212 The average age in California
prisons is increasing, and unless something is done to reverse this
trend, the average cost of taking care of prisoners will continue to
climb..2" A considerable rise in healthcare costs could put
California back in a prison crisis situation, even with a decreased
prison population.214 For these reasons, California should consider
decreasing sentences of prisoners that were sentenced according to
its three strikes law.
205. See TONRY, supra note 10, at 78-79 (describing racist and bipartisan
tendencies in federal drug laws).
206. Id. at 161.
207. Michael M. O'Hear, Statutory Interpretation and Direct Democracy: Lessons
from the Drug Treatment Initiatives, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281, 290-91 (2003).
208. See Males, supra note 90, at 69. After the age of twenty-five, there is a
decrease in felony arrests for each successive age group. Id. For Black Americans,
however, sentencing under the three strikes rule peaks between ages thirty and
fifty. Id.
209. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., 2010 ADULT INSTITUTIONS OUTCOME
EVALUATION REPORT 16 (2010). Recidivism rates generally decrease with age. Id.
When comparing those who are under twenty at the time of release to those over
fifty-five at the time of release, the decrease in recidivism is nearly 20%. Id.
210. Id.
211. Petersilia, supra note 12, at 240 ("On average, the cost of incarcerating
offenders older than age 55 is $69,000 per year, or three times the roughly $22,000
national average cost to keep younger, healthier offenders in prison. Most
additional costs are related to health care.").
212. Id. at 240.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 240-41.
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C. Decreased Use of Imprisonment
A decrease in the use of imprisonment will reduce racial
inequality and overcrowding in California's prisons. Alternatives
to imprisonment, such as community service, exist.215 In exploring
these other options, California should also consider applying "good
time credit"216 to reduce sentence lengths. Many other states allow
for good time credit to be applied to house arrest, or a stepped up
amount of good time credit when a prisoner completes an
educational degree." California does not offer good time credit for
time spent at rehabilitation centers."' In 2008, roughly 26% of all
new males and 33% of females were jailed for drug related
offenses.219 Moving these drug offenders to rehabilitation and then
allowing for good time credit would drastically reduce the number
of people under the Department of Corrections' supervision.220
Decreased use of imprisonment is also an effective method of
decreasing the severity of the criminal system on minorities. In
sheer numerical terms, nothing would decrease the population of
Black Americans in prison more effectively than an actual
decrease in the use of imprisonment. 2 1' Because the racial
disparity in prisons has grown so large, decreasing the disparity
between Black and White inmates by 10% would only decrease
Black incarceration rates by 0.3%.222 On the other hand, cutting
the use of imprisonment in half would reduce incarceration of
Black Californians by 1.33%.223 In California, 48% of the prison
population are non-violent offenders." Forms of punishment
other than incarceration may be better suited for such non-violent
offenders. 22' This change all by itself would take the California
215. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 61.
216. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-50-6-3.3 (2010). Good time credits accrue if a
person "demonstrates a pattern consistent with rehabilitation" or completes
various educational degrees. Id.
217. Id.; Cottingham v. State, 952 N.E.2d 245, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding
that prisoners are entitled to good time credit for home detention).
218. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at vii.
219. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., supra note 11, at 16-17.
220. Cf id. (claiming that if all drug offenders were sent to rehabilitation
instead of prison under the three strikes law, there would be roughly a 30%
decrease in newly admitted prisoners); LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at
vii (allowing these offenders to be treated in rehab and then released on an
accelerated good time schedule would decrease the total time and resources the
state had to spend on drug offenders).
221. TONRY, supra note 10, at 149-51.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 18.
225. O'Hear, supra note 207, at 294-96.
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prison population down to 104% of capacity,226 even lower than the
Court-ordered amount.227 California attempted to radically reduce
the number of drug offenders incarcerated when it passed
Proposition 36.228 However, the results have not produced the type
of dramatic decrease necessary to avoid Constitutional violations,
and the Proposition does not allow for retroactive challenges by
those already sentenced under the three strikes law.229 By
reducing the number of people put in prison initially and by
applying good time credits to alternative forms of punishment,
California can significantly decrease the number of minorities in
its prisons.
D. Changes to the Parole System
California's parole system is a major contributor to the state's
high prison population.23' Parole revocation and recommitting the
parolee to jail is much more prevalent in California than
elsewhere.232 The discretionary nature of the parole system has
sent Black parolees back to prison at a higher rate than White
parolees.233 Categorically, 35% of parole violations are for
technical violations; two-thirds of such technical violations are for
absconding supervision.234 Thirty-nine percent of all parole
violations in California are for minor offenses, usually drug
possession or drug use,23 5 both of which can result in the parolee
being returned to prison.2 6
This bleeds into larger problems: the time spent in prison is
not being used to prepare inmates for their eventual release, and
the communities that receive parolees are not spending resources
to help parolees get jobs.2 7 Many parolees become homeless2" and
226. See LITrLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 18-19.
227. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1917 (2011) (ordering California to reduce
capacity to 137.5%).
228. See O'Hear, supra note 207, at 296.
229. Id. at 312-15.
230. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at vii.
231. Id. at i. The report opens by calling the parole system a billion dollar
failure. Id.
232. Id.
233. Grattet, supra note 79, at 9.
234. Id. at 5. "Absconding supervision" means missing a parole appointment or
forgetting to update the parole officer about the parolee's whereabouts. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at i.




commit technical violations.2 19  To actually solve the parole
problem, prisoners must be prepared to re-enter the community
after their sentence is over. Prisons should partner with county
jails in communities where a parolee will be released and train the
prisoner for a job that will be useful in that community during the
final few months of his or her sentence.2 4 ' Trained prisoners could
then be employed by the state and allowed to establish an income
stream and permanent residence." To reduce parole revocation,
the state could develop gradual sanctions for violations of parole.24 3
First time parole violators or parole violators that commit
victimless crimes could be sentenced to alternative forms of
punishment like community service. Another possible remedy is
to place the decision of whether to revoke parole with a judge
instead of parole officers24 or to waive supervision for certain low-
risk offenders without any history of violence.245
The largest hurdle to changing California's parole system is
going to be overcoming objections from local communities."'
Truthfully, many parolees are going to be a burden to the
community where they wind up, and local cities may have
significant reservations about taking ex-prisoners."' But breaking
the current cycle of returning parolees to prison will free up
resources to help prepare future prisoners to re-integrate with
241
society. If California were to decrease the length of a revocation
sentence from an average of 140 days to 100 days in prison, it
would save the state $300 million.249 The state could then direct
this money towards communities taking in new prisoners, helping
them build housing facilities, increase law enforcement, and
provide general funds. 250 The money saved by making this single
churn/.
239. See Grattet, supra note 79, at 9.
240. LITILE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at vii, x.
241. See id. at ix, x.
242. See CAL. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 11, at 24. In recent years California
has attempted to bridge this gap, but the results of the effort are yet to be fully
understood. See LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, STATE OF CAL., IMPLEMENTING
AB 900'S PRISON CONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION INITIATIVES (2009), available
at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/ab900/ab900_051409.pdf.
243. CAL. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 11, at 34.
244. Grattet, supra note 79, at 3.
245. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 75, at iii. This measure could save the
state between $120 and $300 million each year. Id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. Id. at xv.
249. Id. at iii.
250. Id. at xv.
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change in parole would go a long way towards encouraging cities
to take in parolees.
E. State Sentencing Commissions and Racial Impact
Statements
While the above mentioned reforms will alleviate California's
current crisis, the state must fundamentally alter the way it
punishes crime to achieve its long-term goals. In the long run, a
more deliberative process will serve the state better than the ad
hoc process currently used to determine sentencing.25 Creating a
state sentencing commission and passing a racial impact
statement statute will help control the prison population and
decrease racial disparity.252 Sentencing commissions will help
manage accurate forecasts of the prison population for the long-
term, and can make recommendations to the state legislature to
alter sentence lengths when population forecasts diverge from the
observed prison population.25 Racial impact statements try to
anticipate what the practical outcome will be of changes to
criminal laws or sentencing on racial minorities.254 These two
work in tandem to adjust and manage sentencing to both reduce
the prison population and the racial disparity in prisons.2
Many states today use sentencing commissions as a way to
effectively manage their criminal justice program.2' Typically
sentencing commissions produce guidelines that will go into effect
unless the legislature specifically votes against the proposal.5
This takes the pressure to be "tough on crime" off of the legislature
and relies on the difficulty of producing legislation to overturn
sentencing guidelines as a way to detach sentencing from political
control.25 The sentencing commission then collects data about
individual offenders and modifies sentences accordingly." If the
251. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 38. The sentencing laws that
were put on the books in the 1980s and 1990s now exist because legislative inertia
is too great to repeal. Id. A permanent commission with the charge of evaluating
sentencing laws can be held accountable, where individual legislators may not be.
Id.
252. Mauer, supra note 199 at 19; LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at
38.
253. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 40.
254. Mauer, supra note 199, at 19.
255. See id. at 19-23.
256. Id. at 35. Twenty-one states, the District of Columbia, and the federal
system use sentencing commissions to provide guidelines. Id.
257. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 39.
258. Id.
259. See id. at 41. Such data points include offense type, drug or weapon use,
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committee is permanent, it can modify sentences based on new
data.260 In many sentencing regimes, judges are allowed to depart
or vary from the guidelines based on their discretion as a trial
judge or on specific factors in the guidelines.261 Appellate review of
the sentence can place one more check on the system to make sure
that the goals of uniformity and population control are met.262
California could take this one step further and implement the ABA
recommendations that sentencing commissions include diversion
programs for less serious offenses.2 California prisons are filled
with low-level offenders, so the practical effects of such a plan
would be tremendous.264 Up until now, this idea has been
politically unfeasible, but putting the decision in the hands of a
sentencing commission may increase the likelihood of
implementation.265
The work of the sentencing commission could be bolstered by
the use of a racial impact statement.2 6 Racial impact statements
reflect two general values: decreasing the disparate impact of
criminal laws on minorities and keeping the public safe.267
Sentencing polices that produce unwanted racial disparities also
fail to keep the public safe.2" The goal of the statement is to force
law makers and members of the sentencing committee to think
proactively about the possible racial effects of laws and guidelines
treatment ordered, prior criminal history, and recidivism. Id.
260. Id. at 40. North Carolina and Virginia have especially effective sentencing
commissions, in part, because of their longstanding effort to continually improve
their guidelines. Id.
261. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 39.
262. Id.
263. JUSTICE KENNEDY COMM'N, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORTS WITH
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 30-32 (2004).
264. LITTLE HOOVER COMM'N, supra note 121, at 18 (finding that over 80,000
inmates in California are in prison for non-violent crimes).
265. Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 718 (2005).
In theory, a commission can provide political cover for difficult decisions. Id.
266. Mauer, supra note 199, at 45.
267. Id. at 33.
268. Id. at 33-34. Mauer quotes the United States Sentencing Commission:
[Tihe federal crack cocaine penalties have resulted in thousands of
prosecutions of lower-level African-American defendants, yet have
produced no demonstrable effects on substance abuse or sales. As noted by
the United States Sentencing Commission, an analysis of cocaine price
trends appears inconsistent with a finding that federal cocaine penalties
established under the 1986 Act and incorporated into the guidelines have
had a deterrent effect on cocaine trafficking, and that it is unlikely that
the federal cocaine sentencing policy had a significant deterrent effect on
users.
Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that are being made.269 In theory, multiple agencies and
departments could help prepare racial impact statements, such as
the department of corrections and the state treasury
department.270 Utilizing multiple state agencies to analyze the
racial effect of laws reflects the truth that the disparate impact of
criminal laws on minorities is a multifactor problem that no one
branch of the government can solve on its own.27'
By doing proactive analysis of racial disparity, legislators and
sentencing commission members can honestly answer the
questions, "[D]o the crime control benefits of such a policy
outweigh the consequences of heightened racial disparity? ...
[Aire there alternative policy choices that could address the
problem at hand without such negative effects?""' Policy makers
are then equipped with a range of options to consider." By
equipping policy makers with choices, California can discern at the
time of initial legislative votes the impact of laws on minorities,
rather than waiting years to learn the answer.
Racial impact statements are still a young idea. Few states
have debated their usefulness and fewer have actually
implemented them."' Politicians are hesitant to accept the use of
racial impact statements because they will "inject race" into policy
considerations.'75 Supporters point out that the statements are
just uncovering truths about our criminal justice system."' A
separate consideration of impact statements is their price to the
state; requiring state agencies to produce a report will come at a
cost. Because so few states have implemented impact statements,
cost figures are not yet available. However, running a corrections
system is expensive; the California Corrections and Rehabilitation
269. Id. at 33.
270. Id. at 34-37. The broader the input by various agencies, the more types of
policy options can be presented to policy makers. Id. at 37-41. Currently only
Iowa and Connecticut use racial impact statements. Minnesota Second Chance
Coalition, Racial Impact Statements,
http://www.mnsecondchancecoalition.org/pdf/racial-impact.pdf (last visited Nov. 12,
2012). Illinois, Texas, and Oregon are considering legislation. Id.
271. Mauer, supra note 199, at 20-28. The article discusses several factors that
play into racial injustice in the criminal system such as legislative, enforcement,
sentencing, and processing issues. Id.
272. Id. at 41.
273. Id.
274. Minnesota Second Chance Coalition, supra note 270.
275. Mauer, supra note 199, at 45.
276. Id. Racial impact statements have support from groups such as The
Sentencing Project and the American Bar Association's Justice Kennedy
Commission. Id. Support is also offered by sentencing scholar Michael Tonry. See
TONRY, supra note 10, at 24.
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budget for 2011-2012 is over $9 billion.277 Compared to this figure,
the cost of producing racial impact statements will be minimal.
The savings that the statements can produce by analyzing upfront
the effect of laws on the incarceration of minorities will assuredly
outweigh the cost of their production.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's prison release order in Brown v. Plata
is another reminder of the damage that has been done by the
"tough on crime" movement. In the decades since this country's
policy makers became obsessed with that slogan, prison
populations soared while the level of care in these facilities
declined.' Minorities, particularly Black Americans, have borne a
disproportionate weight of the "tough on crime" policies.' Brown
v. Plata focuses attention on the horrors that have been happening
in California prisons, horrors which have disproportionately
impacted minorities. These human rights violations would likely
never have occurred if "tough on crime" policies had been
controlled in California.280
In reducing its prison population, California should pay
special attention to fixing the racial injustice that its criminal
system has allowed. Therefore, relocating prisoners to other states
or building new prisons are unacceptable options. Instead, the
state should focus on releasing low-level offenders and reforming
its criminal justice structure. Allowing prisoners to appeal their
three strikes convictions and fixing the parole system will help to
reduce the prison population and decrease racial disparity.2 8 1
Parole reform will have a significant impact on controlling prison
populations and racial disparities in the long run as well. Moving
from imprisonment to alternative forms of punishment is the best
way to decrease the number of minorities in prison.8 Finally,
creating a sentencing commission and charging it and other state
agencies with creating racial impact statements will create a
permanent focus on population control and racial disparity. Such
a focus will hopefully avoid ever placing the state or its prisoners
277. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF CORR. AND REHAB., CORRECTIONS AND
REHABILITATION 2 (2011).
278. Petersilia, supra note 12, at 207; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 13.
279. TONRY, supra note 10, at 28-29.
280. Petersilia, supra note 12, at 210-11; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 13.
281. Vitiello, supra note 34, at 456-57; Grattet, supra note 79, at 5-10.
282. Grattet, supra note 79, at 5-10.
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in a similar situation again. California's problems are large and
multifaceted, but if California can come through this difficult time
and institute real reform, the state could become a beacon, not of
shame, but of hope.

